That more work remains to be done is evident from our current work and from the lengthy replies that our paper stimulated. Each pair of authors wrote a comment longer than our original article. They neither agree with us nor with each other on the proposition that evidence supports.
Each raises some points that the other ignores.
The similarity ends there. Bloom and Price offer a scholarly criticism based mainly on their original and interesting work. Their comments are based on their assessment of evidence. We discuss their work first. Goodman and Kramer, on the other hand, offer a seemingly endless number of criticisms supported by little more than prior belief, innuendo and conjecture. Answering each of the charges would take more space and time than the criticisms are worth. We are content to support our claim by discussing a few of their charges and by presenting evidence that most of their claims are empty.
Bloom and Price
Bloom and Price devote most of their comment to testing an alternative hypothesis of the effect of economic variables on congressional elections.
They find evidence to support their hypothesis. If we had developed their evidence, we would have rejected the null hypothesis, as they do.
The hypothesis that Bloom and Price accept is dijferent from Kramer's and, we will argue, much closer to our contention than to his. Bloom and Price show that a decline in real, per capita income hurts the party of the incumbent president in congressional elections. All in all, we find the reformulation and the evidence presented by Bloom and Price intriguing. We hope that either they or others will investigate the asymmetry in the response to changes in real income.
Goodman and Kramer
There is, for us, a considerable difference between the proposition consistent with available evidence and the conclusion reached by Goodman and Kramer. They conclude that "on the basic question of whether such effects exist, it seems to us the evidence is clear: they do." 2/ What are these "effects"? Do voters reward and punish? Or, do they Punish only, as Bloom and Price find? Do voters respond only to recession measured by the negative growth of real income, or to inflation and recession as Kramer concluded? Or do they respond more to inflation, than to income as we found? do regular voters respond or is the main effect on new voters?
Goodman and Kramer do little to advance the discussion beyond the a Eriori position from which they start. They offer almost no evidence to support the strong, and in our view, overstated conclusions they reach.
A typical example of overstatement is the discussion of the evidence they present in The discussion of unemployment in Goodman and Kramer is an example of their a priori approach. -One result shows that changes in unemployment benefit Republicans. This result is rejected as "anomalous."
The level of unemployment benefits Democrats, and the result is accepted as plausible. In fact, the sign of the level of unemployment is negative for the Democrats, and the results show that the Democrats gain only because the Republicans are hurt more. The differences are not significant. shows that the variable has no effect....The data...may be equally consistent with the possibility of very large effects." This is nonsense, pure and simple. Regardless of the size of the coefficient, relatively low t-statistics or large standard errors imply failure to reject the hypothesis that the variable in question has no effect.
Measurement of Economic Variables .
A number of points can be discussed briefly. Some are raised by both critics.
1. We used compensation per man hour. This ignores the unemployed.
This comment is puzzling. We included measures of unemployment separately. Our procedure holds a measure of real income constant when estimating the effect of unemployment.
Real compensation is an inappropriate measure of real income.
Moreover, it is "suspect" (p. 11 of Goodman and Kramer) because real compensation per man-hour rises in recession. This comment and similar comments by Bloom and Price miss the point. One of the questions that we want to answer is whether employed and unemployed workers respond in the same or in different ways to recessions. To separate the two groups we estimate the response to earnings, holding unemployment constant, and the response to unemployment, holding earnings constant. Only from estimates of this kind can we hope to learn whether the voters' response to unemployment or recession extends beyond the particular voters affected by loss of employment. The comment that we should not have deflated by man-hours is correct. We miss the effect of reductions in the work week.
3. We take no account of the agricultural sector. This is false.
We note (footnote 15) that we tried a number of other measures of economic and other issues including agricultural prices.
4. There are many additional criticisms that reveal very little more than Goodman and Kramer's prior beliefs. Several relate to the use of unemployment and the procedures for computing percentages. To find whether the criticisms are substantive, we recomputed the results using: (1) Goodman and Kramer's data series, and ours; (2) using levels of unemployment, changes in unemployment, and percentage changes in unemployment; and (3) using percentages computed on the base t-1 and on the base t. A small sample of our results for aggregate economic variables is shown in Table 1 . Others will be sent on request.
Had Goodman and Kramer used some of the time lavished on their reply to compute these results, they would have found, as we did, tihat their prior beliefs, conjectures about possibilities and most of their criticisms are empty. 6/ Our general conclusion is that most of the Goodman and Kramer points lack substantive content. Either they are inconsequential or they concern potential not actual bias. If we printed all of the Tstimates using the various data sets, we doubt whether any reader would change any conclusion as a result of reading the many pages of output.
Conclusion
The effects of short-term changes in economic conditions on votes for Congress seems to us to remain unsettled. The work to date has produced mainly null results, our own included.
Discussion of this kind occasionally leads scientists to reformulate the disputed proposition. We find the efforts by Bloom and Price and their evidence of interest for this reason. The proposition for which they find support is substantially different from earlier statements of the effect of short-term changes in aggregate economic variables on congressional votes.
Our own work has followed a different course. The basic unit of interest is the distribution of seats, not votes. Investigation of the distribution of seats requires disaggregation to the district level.
Preliminary results suggest that incumbency alone accounts for nearly 80' per cent of the variation in the partisan distribution of seats.
That leaves very little room for aggregate economic variables, but it does not rule out a small effect. Until such effects are found, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. One point on which comment is required. Goodman and Kramer note (p. 10) that there are some substantial discrepancies between their estimates and the results shown in Table 1 of our paper.
We have used both sets of data and, aside from differences attributable to computer routines, we find no substantial differences in results.
